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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DAVID H. KELSEY* and SANFORD H. SIEGEL**
This third annual survey of New Mexico domestic relations law updates
the law from April 1981 to March 1982. During the Survey year, the
New Mexico Supreme Court decided a number of cases in the important
area of jurisdiction under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act.' De-
cisions in the areas of custody, visitation, and child support also broke
new ground and showed an increased willingness by the supreme court
to take strong action against irresponsible behavior by parties toward each
other and toward their children.
I. JURISDICTION AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
Since the last Survey there has been significant litigation in the area
of jurisdiction under the PKPA;. these cases will be discussed in a sub-
sequent section of this article. 2 Two other jurisdiction cases did not involve
the PKPA. In Church v. Church,3 Wife sued Husband in tort, contract,
and equity, seeking damages based on conduct which occurred while the
parties were married and residing in Virginia. Wife had supported Hus-
band during medical school; upon graduation, Husband asked for a di-
vorce. Wife claimed Husband defrauded her by pursuing an extra-marital
relationship, by not intending to stay married once he completed medical
school, and by falsely repesenting his medical education as an investment
of the marriage.4 The trial court dismissed Wife's complaint, holding that
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.'
The New Mexico Court of Appeals examined Wife's complaint to see
if it stated causes of action cognizable under the laws of Virginia. Virginia
law applied because Wife's claims arose out of a course of conduct
*Shareholder, Atkinson & Kelsey, P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico; Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of New Mexico School of Law.
**Associate, Atkinson & Kelsey, P.A.; former Assistant District Attorney, New York County
District Attorney's Office.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter referred to as PKPA].
2. See infra Section lI.A for a discussion of these cases.
3. 96 N.M. 388, 630 P.2d 1243 (Ct. App. 1981). Forfurther discussion of this case, see Johnson,
Commercial Law, ante at 293.
4. 96 N.M. at 390, 630 P.2d at 1245.
5. Id.
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occurring in Virginia.6 The court of appeals reviewed the Virginia law
applicable to Wife's tort, contract, and equitable claims and found that
the facts alleged presented valid claims for relief.7 The court of appeals
reversed the trial court and directed it to reinstate the complaint.
Separate from the instant lawsuit, Mr. and Mrs. Church were also
litigating a suit for dissolution of their marriage. The court of appeals
took note of this second suit and observed that cases arising out of a wife
putting her husband through school "are no longer uncommon." 8 The
court also noted that "this fact situation (wife putting husband through
school) and the resultant disputed claims have been resolved in terms of
property or alimony awards in divorce proceedings." 9 Because the instant
suit arose out of commitments made during the marriage relationship,
Wife's claims could have been resolved in the action for dissolution.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals allowed her to bring the instant suit
independently of the action for dissolution. In the interest of judicial
economy, a party should bring all of her claims at the same time in the
same suit. Although Wife surely deserved her day in court on these claims,
she should have litigated them in the action for dissolution.
Murphy v. Murphy'0 was primarily concerned with jurisdiction to de-
termine custody of the children. The case arose prior to the effective date
of the PKPA or the New Mexico Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act,"1 and the facts illustrate the distressing state of affairs which the
PKPA and the NMUCCJA will hopefully ameliorate.' 2 The custody liti-
6. Id. at 392, 630 P.2d at 1247. The choice of Virginia law, which allows suits between spouses
based on tort, does not offend New Mexico public policy. See Hughes v. Hughes, 91 N.M. 339,
573 P.2d 1194 (1978).
7. 96 N.M. at 397, 630 P.2d at 1252.
8. Id. at 391, 630 P.2d at 1246.
9. Id.
10. 96 N.M. at 401, 631 P.2d 307 (1981).
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-10-1 to -24 (Cum. Supp. 1982) [hereinafter referred to as NMCCJA].
The effective date of the NMCCJA is July 1, 1981. 1981 N.M. Laws ch. 119, §26. The effective
date of the PKPA is December 28, 1980. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980).
12. In Murphy, the parties were married in Oklahoma. The New Mexico trial court granted Wife
a dissolution of marriage and custody of the childen. Husband nevertheless filed for divorce in
Oklahoma, where he obtained a default decree which granted him a divorce and custody of one
child, and which declared the New Mexico decree of dissolution invalid. 96 N.M. at 403, 631 P.2d
at 309. Husband came to New Mexico and moved for a decree invalidating the New Mexico
dissolution. The New Mexico trial court set aside its decree of dissolution, but retained jurisdiction
over custody. The parties, apparently frustrated with the courts, met on their own in Colorado and
drafted a settlement agreement. The Oklahoma trial court, however, ratified only part of that agree-
ment. The parties wound up back in New Mexico where Wife had previously applied for an order
to show cause why Husband and his attorney should not be held in contempt for failure to abide by
previous custody orders of the New Mexico court. The trial court found Husband and his attorney
in contempt, jailed them briefly and enjoined Husband from bringing custody proceedings in any
other court. Id. at 404-405, 631 P.2d at 310-11.
The case eventually reached the New Mexico Supreme Court which held that New Mexico did
not have to give full faith and credit to the Oklahoma decree, and that New Mexico had jurisdiction
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gation between Mr. and Mrs. Murphy resulted in conflicting and overlap-
ping New Mexico and Oklahoma court orders, including determinations
that the other state's rulings were invalid. The New Mexico Supreme
Court eventually decided that New Mexico had jurisdiction to determine
custody; in its opinion the court also discussed, inter alia, the contempt
power and full faith and credit.
II. CUSTODY & VISITATION
A. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
Since its enactment, the PKPA has been at the center of child custody
litigation in New Mexico. It has become a crucial instrument in settling
the kind of questions that plagued both courts and litigants in cases like
Murphy v. Murphy.'3
In State ex rel. Valles v. Brown, ' 4 a consolidation of two cases, the
supreme court ruled that the PKPA pre-empted New Mexico case law
and discussed the purposes of the PKPA and its two-pronged test for
jurisdiction.' 5 In discussing the underlying purposes of the PKPA, the
supreme court stressed the psychological damage done to children who
are the victims of child snatching. Congress enacted the PKPA to eliminate
the damage to children "which is often severe and sometimes irreversible
and irreparable . ,,'" The means of doing this is "by requiring states
to give full faith and credit to custody decrees [of other states]." 7 Thus
"the long line of New Mexico cases which permits a New Mexico court
to modify an out-of-state issued child custody decree based solely on the
to decide custody. The supreme court also stated that the contempt citation against Husband and his
attorney was improper because neither Husband nor his attorney had violated a formal order of the
court. The court held that contempt could not be predicated upon "failure to abide by an agreement,
or obey an order stipulated to by the parties but neither signed nor entered by the court." Id. at 408,
631 P.2d at 314.
13. 96 N.M. 401, 631 P.2d 307 (1981). See supra note 12.
14. - N.M. -_, 639 P.2d 1181 (1981). In the consolidated cases, State ex rel. Valles v. Brown
and Miller v. Love, the supreme court was asked to issue alternative writs of prohibition. For further
discussion of Valles, see Note, Domestic Relations-Interpretation of the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act: State ex rel. Valles v. Brown, post at 527 [hereinafter cited as Note].
15. Under the PKPA, the court must undertake a two-pronged jurisdictional analysis.
According to the PKPA, a New Mexico court may only modify a child custody
decree issued in another state when:
1. New Mexico has jurisdiction under its own law . . . and under the PKPA...
and
2. The state which issued the child custody decree no longer has jurisdiction
under the PKPA and its own law ... or has declined to exercise [it]. ...
- N.M. -. , 639 P.2d at 1184 (citations omitted) (emphasis by the court). See also Kelsey and
Montoya, Domestic Relations, Survey of New Mexico Law: 1980-1981, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 325, 358-
60 for a discussion of the PKPA.
16. - N.M. at -, 639 P.2d at 1184.
17. Id.
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physical presence of the child and a substantial change of circumstances
is pre-empted by the PKPA." 8
In the first Valles case, Miller v. Love, 9 the parties had lived in New
Mexico for about five years when Wife left and took the children to
Arizona. Husband brought the children back to New Mexico without
Wife's consent. Wife sued for dissolution and custody in Arizona. The
Arizona trial court found that Husband had unlawfully removed the chil-
dren from that state and ordered Husband to return the children to Wife.
Husband meanwhile sued for dissolution and custody in New Mexico.
Wife came to New Mexico and appeared in Bernalillo County District
Court to contest that court's jurisdiction and to seek enforcement of the
Arizona decree. The New Mexico trial court gave full faith and credit to
the Arizona decree and awarded custody of the children to Wife.2°
The New Mexico Supreme Court disagreed. Arizona did not satisfy
any of the five jurisdictional grounds of the PKPA. 2" Because Arizona
did not have jurisdiction under the PKPA, New Mexico was not required
to give full faith and credit to Arizona's decree. The supreme court then
considered whether New Mexico had jurisdiction to decide custody under
its own laws and under the PKPA.22 The trial court, which had incorrectly
given full faith and credit to the Arizona decree, never reached this
18. Id.
19. - N.M. - , 639 P.2d 1181 (1981). See supra note 14.
20. - N.M. at , 639 P.2d at 1182.
21. - N.M. at _., 639 P.2d at 1185. Under the PKPA, a state can determine custody if it
has jurisdiction to do so under its own laws and meets one of the following five conditions:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the commence-
ment of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State within six months
before the date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent
from such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant or for other
reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State;
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph
(A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of such State assume
jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection with such State other than mere physical
presence in such State, and (II) there is available in such State substantial evidence
concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has been
abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in any emergency to protect the child because
he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse;
(D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph
(A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate forum
to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child
that such court assume jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this
section.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
22. See supra note 21.
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question. The supreme court therefore remanded the case to the trial court
to decide if New Mexico had jurisdiction to determine custody.2 3
In the second Valles case, State ex rel. Valles v. Brown,2 4 the parties
were divorced in Washington where the court had awarded custody to
Wife. With Wife's consent, Husband brought their daughter to New
Mexico for a visit. He then petitioned in New Mexico for custody. The
trial court denied full faith and credit to the Washington decree because
it was modifiable, and awarded custody to Husband.25
The New Mexico Supreme Court employed the two-pronged PKPA
test and reversed. It held that Washington had jurisdiction and that the
Washington court intended to retain jurisdiction.2 6 If Washington has
jurisdiction and is exercising it, the PKPA mandates that New Mexico
must respect that jurisdiction and cannot determine custody.
The lesson of Valles is that the helter skelter jurisdictional competition
exemplified by Murphy is a relic of the past. The game now has uniform
rules. New Mexico must apply the provisions of the PKPA to each case
to determine if it must give full faith and credit to a foreign decree, or
may decide custody on its own.
Belosky v. Belosky2 is another example of the revolution in custody
jursidiction effected by the PKPA. An Ohio decree gave Wife custody of
the parties' two children, but, as modified, prohibited her from perma-
nently removing them from the state. She nevertheless moved to New
Mexico with the children and petitioned the New Mexico trial court to
modify the Ohio decree to allow her to remain in New Mexico with the
children. Meanwhile the Ohio court had granted Husband temporary
emergency custody of the children.28
Prior to the passage of the PKPA, New Mexico would have found the
"temporary emergency" Ohio decree modifiable and would have declined
to enforce it. However, the supreme court in Belosky found that, under
the PKPA, Ohio had jurisdiction and intended to retain it. Therefore,
New Mexico did not have jurisdiction to modify the Ohio decree and
must give it full faith and credit.29 Finality is no longer the litmus test
23. - N.M. at -, 639 P.2d at 1185.
24. - N.M. -. , 639 P.2d 1181 (1981). See supra note 14.
25. -_ N.M. at - , 639 P.2d at 1182-83.
26. The supreme court noted that the Superior Court Commissioner of Washington had by affidavit
stated that Washington was willing to hear the case. Id. at -, 639 P.2d at 1186. The use of such
affidavits would seem to be sufficient evidence to establish that a state intends to continue to exercise
its jurisdiction.
27. 97 N.M. 365, 640 P.2d 471 (1982). For further discusison of this case, see Note, supra
note 14.
28. 97 N.M. at 366, 640 P.2d at 472.
29. Id. at 366-67, 640 P.2d at 472-73.
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for the enforceability of foreign decrees; instead New Mexico will enforce
those foreign decrees which comply with the jurisdictional requisites of
the PKPA.
B. Contempt
A series of cases during the Survey year analyzed the contempt power
and its use in the domestic relations area. In Gedeon v. Gedeon,3 ° the
New Mexico trial court issued a temporary restraining order placing
temporary custody of both children with Wife. The children went to
Colorado to visit Husband over Christmas vacation. Husband did not
return the children on the agreed date and Wife asked that he be held in
contempt. The trial court found Husband in contempt of its custody order
and fined him $500 a day until he complied.3 The supreme court held
that the fine was an appropriate way for the court to enforce its mandate.
32
The supreme court also discussed the contempt power in two recent
decisions involving husbands who failed to pay child support. In State
ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Rael, 33 Rael, an indigent, moved
for court-appointed counsel to represent him at a contempt proceeding
brought to enforce an order of child support. The trial court denied Rael's
motion and he filed an interlocutory appeal. Rael argued on appeal that,
because he faced the possibility of imprisonment, he was entitled to a
lawyer at the contempt proceeding .34 The supreme court noted that this
was a question of first impression in New Mexico.
The supreme court rejected Rael's argument that the possibility of
imprisonment triggered the right to counsel; it was rather the civil or
criminal nature of the proceeding that was determinative. The court noted
that the purpose of punishing Rael was to secure his compliance with the
trial court's order; therefore this was a civil contempt proceeding.35
The supreme court stated that "due process does not require that ap-
pointed counsel be provided in every instance in which an indigent de-
fendant faces civil contempt charges that might subject him to
incarceration." 36 In civil contempt proceedings to enforce child support,
the issues are usually not complex.37 Furthermore, unlike criminal pro-
ceedings, "the defendant's liberty interest is not . . . full-blown . . ."
because he " 'has the keys to his own prison.' "38 However, the supreme
30. 96 N.M. 315, 630 P.2d 267 (1981).
31. Id. at 315-16, 630 P.2d at 267-68.
32. Id. at 316-17, 630 P.2d at 268-69.
33. 97 N.M. 640, 642 P.2d 1099 (1982).
34. Id. at 642, 642 P.2d at 1101.
35. Id. at 643, 642 P.2d at 1102.
36. Id. at 644, 642 P.2d at 1103.
37. The issues are whether a currently effective order exists, whether the defendant knew about
it, whether the defendant failed to comply, and whether he has the ability to comply. Id.
38. Id.
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court refused to establish a hard and fast rule. It recognized that the trial
court must be given the discretion to decide when fundamental fairness
requires the presence of counsel at a civil contempt proceeding. 39
In Niemyjski v. Niemyjski,4 ° the supreme court again considered the
appropriateness of incarceration as a punishment for civil contempt. The
trial court sentenced Husband to ten days in jail for failure to pay child
support. Husband argued on appeal that incarceration was an impermis-
sibly severe punishment for civil contempt. 4' The supreme court disagreed
and stated that if courts adopted Husband's position:
it would throw the entire system of enforcement of child support
... into chaos. Any person ordered to make payments could merely
ignore the court order until enforcement is sought knowing he could
not be jailed for his refusal to obey the court order. We cannot follow
such illogical reasoning that strips the court of the authority to enforce
its orders.42
Husband also argued that he could not pay child support because he had
substantial business and personal expenses during the relevant period.
The supreme court showed a marked lack of sympathy for his claim,
stating: "If he did so, it was bad judgment on his part and clearly a
willful violation of his obligation. It is unfortunate that he ignored his
most important single obligation, namely the support of his minor child."'43
C. Visitation
In Montero v. Montero,44 the district court granted Wife custody of the
children and granted Husband specified visitation rights, including two
months summer visitation. Wife moved from New Mexico to Texas and
then petitioned the New Mexico trial court for a decrease in Husband's
summer visitation. The trial court held the parties had originally contem-
plated residing in the same general area, and that Wife's move to Texas
was a material change in circumstance justifying a decrease in Husband's
visitation !4
The supreme court first held that the standard used in custody cases,
"the best interests of the children," should be applied in visitation cases
and. "in all matters dealing with the well-being of the minor children."I
The court then observed that there was nothing in the final decree which
evidenced an intent that Husband's visitation rights be dependent upon
39. Id. at 645, 642 P.2d at 1104.
40. 98 N.M. 176, 646 P.2d 1240 (1982).
41. Id. at 177, 646 P.2d at 1241.
42. Id.
43. Id. (emphasis by the court).
44. 96 N.M. 475, 632 P.2d 352 (1981).
45. Id. at 476, 632 P.2d at 353.
46. Id.
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Wife remaining in the vicinity where the parties lived at the time of the
dissolution. Wife was responsible for the change of circumstances, and
its effect was to place a greater burden on Husband to exercise his vis-
itation.4 7 If courts accepted Wife's reasoning, the custodial parent would
have an ex parte method of undermining visitation. The supreme court
reversed the trial court, stating that "[s]uch an inequitable result cannot
be tolerated. "48
In Lopez v. Lopez, 4 9 the supreme court observed that the custodial
parent often frustrates the reasonable visitation envisaged in a decree. If
a trial court thinks there may be disagreement over visitation, it should
specify in the decree "the times, places and circumstances of visitation." 50
In setting visitation, the trial court should focus on "the well-being of
the child" and not on the desires of the parents.
5
'
In Lopez, Husband moved for a change of custody. The trial court
found a long history of problems over visitation and noted that Wife had
previously been held in contempt for failure to comply with Husband's
visitation rights. The trial court awarded custody to Husband, primarily
because of Wife's interference with Husband's visitation rights.
52
The supreme court upheld the trial court's action, relying on "the
modem trend that when the custodial parent intentionally . . . frustrate[s]
• ..visitation . . . a change of custody is an appropriate action." 53 This
radical remedy should put attorneys, if not the parties themselves, on
notice that if custodial parents undermine visitation rights, they may
forfeit custody itself.
II1. ALIMONY
In the area of spousal support, Lovato v. Lovato54 is of special interest
because of its strong language in support of rehabilitative alimony. The
47. Id. at 477, 632 P.2d at 354.
48. Id.
49. 97 N.M. 332, 639 P.2d 1186 (1981).
50. Id. at 334, 639 P.2d at 1188.
51. Id. at 335, 639 P.2d at 1189.
52. Id. at 333-34, 639 P.2d at 1187-88.
53. Id. at 334, 639 P.2d at 1188.
54. 98 N.M. 11, 644 P.2d at 525 (1982).
Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 97 N.M. 133, 637 P.2d 564 (1981), should also be mentioned. The trial
court had determined that Wife's needs would be adequately met by payments from real estate
contracts she had received as her share of the community property. Therefore, the court declined to
award her any alimony.
The New Mexico Supreme Court stated that, when considering whether to make an award of
alimony, the trial court should look at the amount of community property distributed to the wife.
But the trial court must do more than calculate the value of the property at the time of dissolution;
it must look at the nature of the assets awarded, and must consider, inter alia, whether they will
appreciate or depreciate.
The supreme court noted that the real estate contracts awarded Wife would diminish in value as
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parties were divorced in 1977. The court granted Wife custody of their
seven minor children and ordered Husband to pay $600 a month for child
support and alimony.55 Wife asked for alimony "because she intended to
be a full-time homemaker and mother.' 56
In 1980, Husband moved for a reduction in his support payments. At
that time only three of the children, aged 10, 13, and 14, were still at
home. Wife was still receiving $600 a month from Husband. She had
made no effort to find employment or job training since the divorce.
While Husband's income had increased, he had also remarried and ac-
quired three additional children.5
7
The trial court denied Husband any immediate relief and he appealed.
On appeal, he argued that alimony should be used as a vehicle for Wife's
economic rehabilitation, providing her with support while she sought
employment or training. Wife countered that she had no employment
experience or skills, was unable to support herself, and was not obligated
to give up her chosen status as mother and homemaker.58
The supreme court sided with the husband. The court noted approvingly
that other jurisdictions had encouraged the spouse receiving alimony to
seek employment or training, and stated: "It is preferable to use alimony
as a method of allowing a divorced spouse to gain personal independence
by helping the person disadvantaged by the marriage and the divorce to
extricate himself or herself from such a position." 59
The supreme court found that Wife had taken no steps to improve her
situation and had spent her child support and alimony money for items
other than family necessities. Based on these findings, the supreme court
held that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Husband's
request for relief from his alimony payments. 6 It instructed the trial court
to "modify the alimony obligations to the extent necessary to encourage
[Wife] to assume the responsibility for her own care and support." 61
Lovato is important both for its reasoning and its holding. The supreme
they were paid off, while the business property awarded to Husband was likely to appreciate in
value. The court found no evidence that the trial court had considered the contrasting nature of the
assets awarded. The supreme court remanded the case to the trial court to review the issue of alimony
in light of the suggested reevaluation of the property division. Id. at 136, 637 P.2d at 567.
55. 98 N.M. at 12, 644 P.2d at 526. The trial court awarded Wife child support of $75 per child
per month and alimony of $75 per month for a total of $600. It also provided that as each child
was emancipated, alimony would increase by $75 per month. Thus the total support paid to Wife
would remain fixed at $600 per month. At the time Husband moved for relief, his monthly payments
consisted of $225 for child support and $375 for alim~ony.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 13, 644 P.2d at 527 (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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court expressed a strong preference for the use of alimony to support a
spouse while he or she gains the training, skills, or job experience nec-
essary to achieve financial independence. Alimony should usually contain
the seeds of its own termination. The court did not, however, promulgate
an inflexible rule. Lovato does not require an older spouse who has been
a homemaker in a long-term marriage to enter the work force to support
herself. Lovato does, however, speak to younger women capable of em-
ployment. It suggests that they may no longer be able to elect the profes-
sion of homemaker with the expectation of continuing spousal support.
The supreme court told Mrs. Lovato to take steps to seek outside em-
ployment, notwithstanding the fact that she still had three of her ex-
husband's children under her care. The supreme court directed the trial
court to adjust Mrs. Lovato's spousal support to the extent necessary to
start her on the road toward personal financial independence.
IV. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Plaatje v. Plaatje,62 Husband was a military officer who began
receiving retirement benefits in 1972. The parties were divorced in 1973.
Wife knew about Husband's retirement benefits at that time, but made
no claim to them. She said she did not learn she had a right to share in
his retirement benefits until July 1977. It was not until July 1978, however,
that Wife sued for her share of those benefits.63 The trial court dismissed
her complaint as barred by the statute of limitations.
Husband argued that Wife's action was barred under New Mexico's
general purpose statute of limitations which sets a four-year limitation
for "all other actions not herein otherwise provided for and speci-
fied. . . ."' Wife had brought suit under N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-4-20,65
and argued that that statute was a timeless grant of authority to sue for
division of property. The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with Hus-
band that section 37-1-4 was the appropriate statute of limitations. 66
The supreme court further held, however, that the four-year period did
not run from the date of dissolution, but from the date that each installment
became due. 67 Thus Wife was eligible to recover her share of all install-
62. 95 N.M. 789, 626 P.2d at 1286 (1981).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 790, 626 P.2d at 1287. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-4 (1978).
65. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-4-20 (1978), provides that:
The failure to divide the property on dissolution of marriage shall not affect
the property rights of either the husband or wife, and either may subsequently
institute and prosecute a suit for division and distribution, or with reference to
any other matter pertaining thereto,'which could have been litigated in the original
proceeding for dissolution of the marriage.
66. 95 N.M. at 790, 626 P.2d at 1287.
67. Id. at 790-91, 626 P.2d at 1287-88.
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ments paid to Husband during the four years prior to her filing suit in
1978.
Although the supreme court held that the statute of limitations did not
bar Wife's claim, the court was clearly unhappy with the outcome. Wife
knew of the benefits in 1973 and had unreasonably delayed in bringing
her action. Husband in the meanwhile had supported himself with the
benefits. The supreme court made a point of suggesting to the trial court
that "there may be other equitable doctrines which would bar her recovery
of the monies received by her former husband in the past." 68
V. PROPERTY DIVISION
A. Form of Title
Holding property "as Husband and Wife" or "as joint tenants" leads
many people to believe that they own half of the property. A number of
cases decided during the Survey year demonstrate that "titles" can often
be misleading. Parties should instead look to the source of funds used to
purchase the property.69 In Hughes v. Hughes,7" Husband had acquired
the marital residence by inheritance from his mother. During the marriage,
he executed a deed transferring the residence to himself and his wife as
joint tenants. Wife argued that the residence had become community
property. The supreme court disagreed, stating that the deed "creates a
presumption that a joint tenancy is created unless there is evidence show-
ing the contrary.""' The court noted that "there is nothing in the record
to indicate that its present ownership is other than by joint tenancy," and
held that Husband did not intend to make a gift of the residence to the
community.72
68. Id. at 791, 626 P.2d at 1288.
69. In Espinda v. Espinda, 96 N.M. 712, 634 P.2d 1264 (1981), the mortgage and deed to the
marital residence were both in the names of Husband and Wife. The money to purchase the property,
however, came from Husband's separate funds. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the
residence was Husband's separate property. See also First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Abraham,
97 N.M. 288, 639 P.2d 575 (1982), in which the supreme court held that a note, because it was
contracted for during marriage, was a community debt even though Husband took it out in his name
alone. The court also held that the renewal note was not binding on Wife because it was signed by
Husband after their divorce.
70. 96 N.M. 719, 634 P.2d 1271 (1981). On a separate issue of first impression, the Hughes
court held that federal civil service disability benefits earned during the marriage were community
property. For further discussion of this issue, see Note, Community Property-Spouse's Future
Federal Civil Service Disability Benefits are Community Property to the Extent the Community
Contributed to the Civil Service Fund During Marriage: Hughes v. Hughes, 13 N.M.L. Rev. 193
(1983).
71. 96 N.M. at 725, 634 P.2d at 1277. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §47-1-16 (1978), which reads in
part: "An instrument conveying ...title to real or personal property to two or more persons as
joint tenants ...shall be prima facie evidence that such property is held in a joint tenancy .
72. 96 N.M. at 725, 634 P.2d at 1277.
Spring 19831
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
B. Life Insurance
In In re Estate of Schleis, 7 3 the issue was whether dissolution alone
extinguishes an ex-spouse's beneficial interest in an insurance policy. The
decree of dissolution granted Husband ownership of an insurance policy
on his life. After his death, Husband's personal representative and his
ex-wife litigated the distribution of the death benefits.74 The supreme
court held that dissolution per se does not extinguish a spouse's beneficial
interest in the life insurance policy of the other spouse. Where, as in
Schleis, the decree merely granted ownership of the policy to Husband,
Wife's beneficial interest survived. Wife's interest could have been ex-
tinguished only if Husband had changed the beneficiary or if tbe policy
itself divested Wife of beneficial ownership upon dissolution.75
C. Community Property
Portillo v. Shappie7 6 is a case of particular interest in the area of
community property. In 1950 Manuel Portillo married Frances Montano.
They moved into a two-room adobe structure which she owned as her
separate property, and resided there continuously through the twenty-six
years of their married life. Portillo made substantial improvements to the
property using community funds and his own labor. He doubled the size
of the original structure and added a separate apartment. Shortly before
her death, Montano deeded the property to her daughter, Ida Shappie.77
Portillo made no claim of ownership to the property, nor did he contest
the transfer of the property to Ida Shappie. He asked the trial court to
impose an equitable lien on the real estate on behalf of the community.
The trial court found that the present value of the property was $33,400,
and the increase in value due to the improvements was $24,900. However,
the court limited Portillo's community lien to $2800, the value of the
money and labor he invested in the improvements.78
The New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's $2800
award. 79 The supreme court granted certiorari to decide the value of the
community lien. The court framed the issue as: "what is the proper
measure of the community's recovery when the community has invested
73. 97 N.M. 561, 642 P.2d 164 (1982).
74. Id. at 561-62, 642 P.2d at 164-65.
75. Id. at 562-63, 642 P.2d at 165-66.
76. 97 N.M. 59, 636 P.2d 878 (1981). For further discussion of this case, see Alcock, Estates
and Trusts, post at 395.
77. 97 N.M. at 59-60, 636 P.2d at 878-79.
78. Id. at 60, 636 P.2d at 879.
79. Id. See Shapiro, Domestic Relations and Juvenile Law, Survey of New Mexico Law: 1979-
1980, 11 N.M.L. Rev. 135, 140 (1980), for a discussion of the New Mexico Court of Appeals
decision.
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its labor and funds in improving the separate realty of one of the spouses. ,80
The court noted that this was a question of first impression in New Mexico.
The supreme court stated that it would "look to general principles of
community property law for guidance." 8' The court noted that "courts
of New Mexico have long struggled with the meaning of 'rents, issues
and profits' of property in the context of community investments of funds
and labor in the separate . . . property of one of the spouses." 82 No single
method of apportionment has ever been adopted. Instead, the courts have
endeavored to do "substantial justice" on the facts of each case.
The supreme court acknowledged the Spanish civil law rule that limited
the community's recovery to the cost of the improvements made to the
separate property. 83 The court emphasized, however, that while it would
look to the principles of Spanish and Mexican civil law for guidance, it
would not be bound by any particular civil law rule or precedent. In
Portillo, in order to accomplish its aim of doing "substantial justice,"
the supreme court rejected the Spanish civil law rule. 84 The years of effort
and skill that Manuel Portillo invested in the property had resulted in a
tremendous increase in value. The court stated that the increase in value
of this separate property "represents the rents, issues and profits of com-
munity property, and to deny the community the right to a lien for that
amount would do substantial injustice under the facts of this case. "85 The
supreme court reversed the trial court and the court of appeals, and
awarded Manuel Portillo a community lien of $24,900 in the separate
property homestead.86
D. Retirement
McCarty v. McCarty87 has, like a lightning rod, concentrated attention
on the divisibility of governmental retirement benefits earned by one
80. 97 N.M. at 60, 636 P.2d at 879.
81. Id. at 61, 636 P.2d at 880.
82. Id. at 62, 636 P.2d at 881.
83. Id. at 63, 636 P.2d at 882.
84. Id. at 64, 636 P.2d at 883.
85. Id.
86. Id. For a discussion of the effects of Portillo, see Ellis, The Impact of Portillo v. Shappie on
New Mexico Communiry Property Law, State Bar of New Mexico, Section on Women's Legal Rights
and Obligations Newsletter, vol. III, no. 3, at 6 (May 31, 1982) (available from the New Mexico
State Bar Office). In his article, Professor Ellis discussed the following questions presented by
Portillo:
(1) What kind of property is subject to the holding--community residence only,
house only, non-income producing only? (2) What kind of community contribution
is necessary to bring the holding into play-improvement only, mortgage pay-
ments, tax and insurance payments? (3) How much discretion do trial courts have
in deciding whether or not to apply Portillo to a given fact situation?
ld. at 8.
87. 453 U.S. 210 (1981). In McCarty, the Supreme Court held that military retirement benefits
were not subject to division upon dissolution of marriage. A recent federal law overruled McCarty.
See infra note 89.
Spring 1983]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
spouse during coverture. Although McCarty dealt specifically with mil-
itary retirement, in dicta the supreme court also addressed civil service
and other government retirement programs. The strong trend throughout
the nation has been to grant the non-pensioned spouse, usually the wife,
an interest in the retirement benefits of the governmental employee spouse.88
McCarty, with its specific holding that military retirement benefits were
not divisible, had stood as the exception to the general trend.
Congress has now overruled McCarty in the Uniformed Services For-
mer Spouses' Protection Act.89 This law, which took effect on February
1, 1983, provides, inter alia, that military retirement benefits are subject
to division by state courts; that the appropriate Secretary shall make direct
payments of retirement pay to certain former spouses; and that certain
former spouses will become eligible for medical benefits and commissary
privileges.' °
VI. SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON FAMILY
COURT REFORM
On August 31, 1982, the New Mexico Supreme Court released the
Proposed Rules and Forms drafted by the Supreme Court Committee on
Family Court Reform. The Committee recommended the adoption of
guidelines for the amount of child support to be paid by the non-custodial
parent; the use of mediation; the establishment of a state-wide Marriage
and Divorce Registry; the use of a model temporary domestic order; and
the filing of statements of financial condition by both parties thirty days
before the trial on the merits. 9 After receiving comments from the New
Mexico Bar, the supreme court will decide which, if any, of the proposals
it will adopt.
88. See, e.g., Hughes v. Hughes, 96 N.M. 719, 634 P.2d 1271; see also supra note 70.
89. Pub. L. No. 97-252, §§ 1001-1006, 96 Stat. 730 (1982) (to be codified in scattered sections
of 10 U.S.C.). Section 1408 of the Act provides in part: "a court may treat disposable retired or
retainer pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property
solely of ihe member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of
the jurisdiction of such court." The law thus appears to authorize state courts to review their post-
June 25, 1981, decrees which, under the constraint of McCarty, classified military retired pay as
the separate property of the member.
90. See Pub. L. No. 97-252, §§ 1001-1006, 96 Stat. 730 (1982) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 10 U.S.C.).
91. Proposed Rules and Forms, Supreme Court Committee on Family Court Reform (Proposed
Draft 1982). The child support guidelines proposed by the Committee were 20% of the non-custodial
spouse's net income for the first child, 10% for the second child, 8% for the third child, and 8%
for each additional child. The court would issue the domestic order automatically; the order would
restrain both parties from harassing each other and from abusive conduct, and from wasting or
disposing of community assets. The statement of financial condition would include documents on
community assets and liabilities, separate property, monthly income and expenses, and estimated
child support obligation.
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CONCLUSION
In domestic relations, perhaps more than in any other area of law, the
parties have paid an indifferent obedience to the mandates of the courts,
and, by and large, they have gotten away with it. Compliance with orders
of child support and alimony is abysmal; parents deny visitation at whim
or use it to accomplish a de facto change of custody. Sanctions are either
wanting altogether or applied too irregularly to have a general deterrent
effect.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in the cases reported during the
Survey year, has grown increasingly impatient with this state of affairs.
The court expects adults to behave responsibly toward each other and the
children they brought into the world. The supreme court is no longer
willing to tolerate the irresponsibility of husbands who do not support
their children, wives who make no effort to achieve financial independ-
ence, and custodial parents who obstruct visitation.
The supreme court is now supporting the efforts of trial courts to deal
with abusive and irresponsible conduct. Incarceration for contempt, re-
duction of alimony, and change of custody are some of the measures
taken to make divorced adults behave in a responsible fashion. The de-
cisions made and the language used by the supreme court provide some
hope that judges will have better success in enforcing the humane usages
which, in the domestic area, have been routinely flouted for so long.
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